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THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL DIMENSIONS ON
SALES FORCE COMPENSATION
Financial compensation has long been held as the primary motivator of salespeople.  Motivation
however may be achieved differently in various countries, as the large disparities in pay schemes across
countries seem to indicate.  In this paper, the authors explore the impact of cultural dimensions on sales
force compensation structures.  Using data collected from financial companies of three European
countries, they (1) assess transnational cultural profiles of managers (i.e., market-, group-centric and
hybrid), (2) confirm discrepancies in terms of managerial preferences for compensation structures and
(3) uncover associated rationales such as rejection of incentive compensation due to its perceived
immorality.  The results indicate that cultural dimensions explain managers choice for (1) the use of
incentive pay in the compensation package (i.e., fixed versus variable compensation) as well as (2) the
basis for its allocation (i.e., individual versus group).  The authors conclude by discussing the implications
of their research for designing compensation plans in the global market place.3
As the European unification deepens, a growing number of companies are considering  expanding or
restructuring their marketing and sales effort in the European Union to take full advantage of the single
currency market.  As a result, sales forces of companies operating in Europe will probably be
reorganized and their management deeply modified (The Wall Street Journal Europe 1998).  Clearly,
new compensation plans are likely to be designed for salespeople of various countries, who are,
according to noted surveys, paid differently depending on their country of origin (L’Express 1994).  For
instance, only 11% of U.S. firms (Sales Personnel Report 1988), 17% of British firms (Donaldson
1990), compared to 40% of French firms (Action Commerciale 1994) use salary, commission and
bonus to compensate their salespeople. In Germany the ratio of fixed to total compensation appears to
be far above the 60% average reported for American firms (Albers et al. 1998; Dartnell 1999).  These
differences are also evident at the sales management level where Spanish, French and Italian sales
managers seem to earn far less than their German or British counterparts according to a recent survey
(Hewitt Associates-Maesina International Search 1998).
In spite of the evidence on compensation discrepancies across countries, cross-national sales force
compensation receives little attention in the academic marketing literature.  One rare exception is Hill et
al. (1990) who include sales force compensation in their study of the level of influence head offices of
multinational corporations exert on sales policies of subsidiaries operating in 45 countries.  Yet, as their
study does not focus on sales force compensation per se, the questions pertaining to country-specific
sales compensation preferences were not answered.  Such an issue seems important as developing
effective international compensation provides an opportunity to gain a competitive advantage (Milkovich
and Bloom 1998).4
American managers  do not  have  much  systematically developed knowledge to help guide their
compensation development efforts for sales forces, which are currently compensated under widely
different plans. This paper focuses on sales forces operating in Europe, as this market (1) is one of the
world’s wealthiest and largest, and (2) poses challenging problems regarding sales force compensation
across the variety of national cultures. More specifically, this article directly addresses the issue of sales
force compensation plan in a cross national setting and focuses on the role, if any, that culture plays in
preferences toward sales force compensation.
This topic is important for several reasons. First, research has shown that the strongest motivators for
salespeople are monetary rewards (Ford et al. 1981).  Needless to say, ill-defined sales force
compensation plans can prove disastrous for organizations (e.g., Financial Times 1998; The Wall
Street Journal 1990).  Second, Europe presents unique challenges in terms of international marketing
strategy so more research is needed (Szymanski et al. 1993).  Third, if preferences for certain types of
sales force compensation structures are culturally based phenomena, this study could help generalize the
principles guiding the design and management of sales force compensation.  Furthermore, as empirical
research on sales force compensation has focused on determinants of pay structures other than national
culture, this new factor will allow further hypothesis testing.
The objective of this study is to establish the existence of culturally bound preferences pertaining to sales
force compensation.  Toward this end, Hofstede’s framework (1980) is used to examine the link
between sales force compensation preferences and cultural dimensions.  The paper is organized as
follows.  First, its research question is positioned within the sales force compensation literature. Second,
tentative research propositions about the link between culture and sales force compensation plans are5
developed. Third, the research methodology, which involved sampling European managers from financial
institutions across three countries, is explained.  Then, the results and implications are discussed.  Finally,
directions for further research are proposed.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS
For several decades, the traditional description of compensation practices has been enriched with
psychological, organizational, institutional and economic theories.  Walker et al. (1977) use of a
psychological framework to model salesperson’s performance prompted considerable subsequent
research. In their model, they developed several propositions about the characteristics of salespeople
and their work environment that explain performance.  Several issues are scrutinized in this paradigm,
but the related issue of the motivational aspects of financial sales compensation received less attention.
Hence, most of those studies were centered on pay valences, satisfaction with pay or pay instrumentality
(e.g., Apasu 1987; Churchill et al. 1979; Churchill and Pecotich 1982; Fry et al. 1987; Ingram and
Bellenger 1983) but not on factors determining compensation structures.
Empirical studies based on organizational, institutional or economic theories, focus on factors such as:
work environment and selling task characteristics, and evaluation issues to explain the ratio of incentive
compensation (e.g., Anderson 1985; Oliver and Anderson 1994; Coughlan and Narasimhan 1992;
Eisenhardt 1985; John and Weitz 1989).  None, however, mentions culture as a possible determinant of
compensation schemes.
Finally, another branch of the economic stream of research focuses on optimal sales force compensation
using a microeconomic analytical approach (e.g., Farley 1964; Darmon 1974; Davis and Farley 1971;6
Srinivasan 1981; Tapiero and Farley 1975; Weinberg 1975; 1978).  This approach, later based on
agency theory, currently represents the dominant literature. (See Basu et al. 1985; Dearden and Lilien
1990; Joseph and Thevaranjan 1998; Joseph and Kalwani 1995; Lal 1986; Lal, Outland and Staelin
1990; Lal and Srinivasan 1993; Mantrala and Raman 1990; Mantrala, Raman and Desiraju 1997;
Mantrala, Sinha and Zoltners 1994; Raju and Srinivasan 1996; Rao 1990; Zhang and Mahajan 1995)
For detailed reviews of this literature, see also Albers (1996), Coughlan (1993), and Coughlan and Sen
(1989).  Most of these studies examined the effects of various factors such as environmental uncertainty,
marginal cost, sales effort effectiveness, and salesperson risk aversion on the optimal levels of incentive
compensation, commission rates, sales effort, or profit. Again, culture is not part of the comparative-
static effects investigated.
Despite the intense research effort briefly overviewed above, investigations of cultural characteristics as
factors related to specific types of sales force compensation plans are rare.  In fact, there is a paucity of
research on cross-national compensation in general (Harvey 1993). Comparative empirical research of
compensation  focusing on groups of employees other than salespeople seems to have opened the
ground for such investigation. Indeed, research has examined comparative compensation of (1)
executives (e.g., Pennings 1993; Roth and O’Donnell 1996), (2) manufacturing industry workers (e.g.,
Townsend et al. 1990), (3) managers (e.g., Vance et al. 1992) and (4) business employees (e.g., Chen
1995), and all of the above (e.g., Schuler and Rogovsky 1998).  As the results of those studies suggest
national culture  influences  compensation  practice, the investigation of such a relationship in sales
management may be useful.7
In this article, some of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (1980) are used to examine the link between
culture and sales force compensation since their validity have been supported in numerous empirical
studies (Nakata and Sirakumar 1996).  Furthermore, two dimensions of compensation structures are
examined.  The use of variable or fixed compensation is the first one.  It has been the center of most
research on empirical (e.g., Coughlan and Narasimhan 1992; Eisenhardt 1985; 1988; John and Weitz
1989), theoretical (e.g., Basu et al. 1985; Dearden and Lilien 1990; Lal and Srinivasan 1993; Rao
1990), and managerial fronts (e.g.,  Sales & Marketing Management  1997).  The second one
examines the basis for incentive allocation following either the equity or the equality principle.  This is
important since team selling is increasingly being used for winning and servicing customers (Churchill et
al. 1997).  Consequently, the basis for rewarding individual versus group effort is an issue of substantial
importance.  The remainder of this chapter is organized around the potential links existing between
national culture dimensions and those two dimensions of compensation structure.
RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS
Uncertainty avoidance and risk aversion
Much of the previous salesforce compensation research based on agency theory  examined optimal
compensation structures in uncertain environments. In their seminal article, Basu et al. (1985) show that
agents, who are assumed to be risk averse, require premiums to compensate the risk.  Hofstede’s
research (1991, p. 116) identified a closely related concept that is linked, but not identical, to the notion
of attitude toward risk. This concept is uncertainty avoidance. According to this author, u ncertainty
avoidance is a diffuse sense of unease about a situation.  For  salesforce compensation, uncertainty
avoidance can be tied to risk aversion as it may arise in both the effort-reward and effort-sales8
relationships (Oliver and Weitz, 1991). First, salespeople do not know exactly what their compensation
will be for specific level of efforts. This may occur because of subjective evaluations, because they do
not understand their compensation package or cannot compute the financial rewards corresponding to
given levels of effort (their plan may be too complex or may rely on future results). Second, salespeople
are confronted to stochastic sales response functions.  In other words, they are never certain about the
level of sales resulting from given levels of effort. The combinations of these factors create ambiguity
about  the  achievability of  financial rewards. Consequently, managers belonging to cultures where
uncertainty avoidance is high are likely to prefer compensation plans that reduce ambiguity, and therefore
choose fixed plans. Such an argument is consistent with the theoretical proposition that risk should be
transferred from the salesperson to the company through fixed salary if environmental uncertainty
becomes more prevalent (Basu et al., 1985). The hypothesis implied by this discussion follows:
H1: High (low) degrees of uncertainty avoidance positively (negatively) affect
managers' preferences for fixed compensation of salespeople.
Masculinity vs. femininity
Assertiveness  versus  nurturance  seems to be  the opposing values describing  Hofstede’s cultural
dimension of masculinity – feminity
i. In masculine societies, people are supposed to be tougher and
focused on material success whereas people in feminine societies are supposed to be more tender and
concerned with the quality of life (Hofstede 1991, p. 82).  The greater emphasis masculine societies
place on wealth, material things and achievement is expressed by the external motivation provided by
financial incentives. Salespeople operating in those cultural environments are more likely to be concerned
with their results and look for opportunities to gain high levels of remuneration. In line with this reasoning,
individual financial rewards should be positively valued in masculine societies since individual9
performance evaluation provides the tools conducive to competition. In contrast, salespeople operating
in feminine societies are believed to prefer nurturing environments and the opportunity to develop
relationships and work in teams. The prototypical salesperson of those cultural environments is likely to
be evaluated as a member of a team and remunerated with shared financial rewards. Indirect support is
provided by Oliver and Anderson (1994) who show that the behavior-based sales control system
perceived by the salesperson is related to a lack of extrinsic motivation, teamwork and fixed pay
packages. Therefore:
H2a: High (low) degrees of masculinity positively (negatively) affect managers'
preferences for incentive compensation of salespeople.
H2b: High (low) degrees of masculinity negatively (positively) affect managers'
preferences for group allocation of incentive compensation of salespeople.
Individualism vs. collectivism
Individualism captures the cultural pattern of seeking personal interest, freedom and challenge (Hofstede
1991). This cultural dimension has been widely researched and it has been established that individualists
prefer to allocate rewards proportionally to individual contributions. Collectivists however, prefer to
allocate rewards equally among group members (Bond, Leung and Wan 1982; Chen, Chen and Meindl
1998; Hofstede 1991; Hui, Triandis and Yee 1991; Leung and Bond 1984). From those principles of
equity vs. equality, the following proposition can be derived for salespeople:
H3: High (low) degrees of individualism negatively (positively) affect managers'
preferences for group allocation of incentive compensation of salespeople.
National Culture
The business press reports that sales management practices differ widely across Europe. A recent
survey found large gaps among European sales managers earnings: Spanish, Italian or French sales10
managers evidently earn significantly less than their German or British colleagues (Hewitt Associates-
Maesina International Search 1998). In another survey, French, German and Italian salespeople
behavioral strategies were depicted as widely divergent (L’Express 1996). The French salesperson
appears to use a more technical selling approach, while German and Italian counterparts were
respectively described as more rigorous and better negotiators. Other discrepancies are likely to exist in
salespeople pay packages. Various sources confirm the existence of those differences at the
compensation level (Action Commerciale 1994; Albers et al. 1998; Dartnell 1999; Donaldson 1990).
In keeping with  the previously formulated  H1 and H2a, and  Hofstede’s (1980) assessment of
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity levels for France (scores: 86 and 43 respectively), Germany
(scores: 65 and 66 respectively) and Italy (scores: 75 and 70 respectively), we hypothesize the
following:
H4a: Managers' preferences for fixed compensation of salespeople will be higher in
France than in Italy and Germany.
Similarly, H2b, H3 and Hofstede’s (1980) evaluation of masculinity and individualism scores for France
(scores: 43 and 71 respectively), Germany (scores: 66 and 67 respectively) and Italy (scores: 70 and 76
respectively) suggest the following hypothesis:
H4b: Managers' preferences for group allocation of incentive compensation of
salespeople will be lower in Italy than in France or Germany.
Personal Characteristics of Managers
As noted earlier, cultural dimensions have not been investigated as possible antecedents of salesforce
pay packages. Furthermore, research in sales compensation is almost entirely devoted to the salesperson
(Bellenger et al. 1984). For instance, salespeople selling tasks, environment and personal characteristics11
(e.g., Anderson 1985; Basu et al. 1985; Coughlan and Narasimhan 1992; Eisenhardt 1985, 1988; John
and Weitz 1989) have been suggested as explanatory variables for the use of incentive compensation.
But two managerial characteristics appear to be particularly relevant to the choice of compensation
plans, namely: hierarchical position and expatriation experience.
First, high level managers are likely to be more concerned with organizational performance.  It follows
then that they should favor incentive-based compensation plans distributed individually since (1) incentive
pay is tied directly to the achievement of organizational goals and (2) individual rewards reinforce the link
between effort and results.  Therefore:
H5a: Managers' preferences for incentive compensation of salespeople will be greater
for managers higher in the hierarchy.
H5b: Managers' preferences for individual allocation of incentive compensation of
salespeople will be greater for managers higher in the hierarchy.
Second, as discussed in  Brewster (1991, p. 77), foreign salary packages of expatriate managers
generally include base salary and incentives. Consequently, managers who worked abroad are more
familiar with them. In addition, managerial-level people with an expatriate experience are likely to be less
averse to uncertainty and more ambitious since expatriation represents both diffuse uncertainty and
known risks. Indirect support is provided by Hutton (1988) who finds successful expatriate managers
are characterized by higher ambiguity tolerance. Brewster (1991, p. 101) also shows that the quest for a
higher income is among the 5 most important reasons mentioned by managers for accepting foreign
posting. Consequently:
H6a: Managers' preferences for incentive compensation of salespeople will be higher
for managers with expatriation experience than for managers without it.12
H6b: Managers' preferences for individual  allocation of  incentive compensation of
salespeople will be higher for managers with expatriation experience than for
managers without it.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASURES
A scenario approach was used in order (1) to increase the contextual similarity of the decision setting
across respondents and (2) to insure respondents would make decisions on the basis of deeply held
values, such as cultural  ones. Hence, as the goal of this study is to evaluate the impact of cultural
dimensions on salesforce compensation, it is important that the research instrument evokes these strongly
held values.  Therefore, the compensation scenario was developed through interviews of about 100
European business managers using semi-structured questionnaires and eliciting critical incidents
concerning the human resource management problems faced by organizations in the European Union.
The resulting critical incidents, accompanied by theoretical and practical information were used to
develop the prototypical compensation decision.  This procedure is likely to better evoke deeply held
cultural values for several reasons.  First Schein (1986) argues that values lie at the lower levels of
human consciousness and are difficult to evoke.  Second, Nisbett and Ross (1980) believe that human
values are stored in memories of events or situations (i.e., scripts) which  must be triggered to be
recovered. The presentation of vivid information (i.e., very concrete, case-based, detailed situational
information) as opposed to pallid information (i.e., abstract, summarized, not detailed and emotionally
poor) helps respondents get in touch with deeply held values. Therefore scenarios (1) describing typical
organizational situations, (2) based on real events, and (3) a ccompanied with emotional  arguments
favoring one plan or another, should better uncover cultural values than typical survey methods.  This13
conjecture is supported by experiments conducted by Nisbett and Cohen (1996). They found that using
typical questionnaires to measure the appropriateness of violent responses returned similar scores on
regionally distributed samples. However using situational research instruments with specific rather than
abstract information returned more divergent views about the use of violence.
In the current study, a one-page scenario accompanied by  a choice question and  an  open-ended
question devoted to the justification of the choice, was used.  Additionally, demographic data about the
respondent were collected. The scenario describes a meeting between a director and four managers,
where the director outlined the organizational and choice situation  concerning  a new compensation
scheme for a salesforce consisting of 450 salespeople. Each of the four participating managers took
different positions defending one or the other of the compensation plans using various arguments based
on original stories, actual industry practices or relevant theoretical propositions. A table summarizing
their four choices was provided. In the scenario, the meeting is adjourned before a decision can be
made. Then the respondents are asked to choose one of the four compensation plans and to justify it.
This scenario, first written in English, was then translated in German, French and Italian
ii.  In the pretest,
local managers from each country reviewed the story and choices to insure that the problem was clearly
presented and not far removed from actual choices available in their local industry.
To uncover national values the sample needed to be drawn from an environment relatively
uncontaminated by foreign ideas and practices, that is, one isolated from international influences.  The
European banking sector, especially branch banking networks, was selected because it remains a local
business in many European countries. The number of foreign banks in the three countries studied,
France, Germany and Italy, does not exceed 5% (European Financial and Marketing Association14
1993). The international exchange of personnel and use of expatriates remains limited in the banking
sector. As argued by Hofstede (1991, p. 251) cross-national samples do not need to be representative
but should be functionally equivalent so that they are well matched.
Banks from each country were contacted by a local researcher and invited to participate in the study.
The banks were asked to randomly distribute, across functions and hierarchical grades, the research
instrument to managers within their branch-banking network. The responses were returned directly to
the researchers by mail. The response rate varied between 60% in France, 90% in Italy, and 98% in
Germany, for a total number of 201 returned questionnaires. An analysis of the descriptive variables
(age, gender, seniority in financial sector, hierarchical level) revealed that the respondents were mostly
males (more than 90%), in their forties (about 43 years old on average), with an average seniority of 20
years in the financial sector, and a medium high hierarchical position. Furthermore 95% of the sample
had never worked abroad.
Choice justifications were offered by  95% of  the respondents  providing 1 to 18 sentences per
respondent (with a 5-sentence average per respondent). Tests performed to look for possible sources of
variations in the justification length found only a respondent age significant. Younger managers explained
their motivations more extensively than did older ones. Other tests performed to look for the possible
impact of organizational factors on salesforce schemes confirmed that the bank unit did not influence
compensation choices.
In summary, the data collection method (1) provided  standardized information  to the  respondents,
therefore reducing the impact of specific firm contexts and (2) generated culturally rich quantitative and15
qualitative data  necessary to  compare European managers' rationales for compensation system
preference.
Cultural Dimensions Measurement
Three new cultural dimension scores were assessed  using the qualitative data provided by the
respondents.  This was necessary for two basic reasons.  First Hofstede's (1980) cultural dimension
measurements were made almost 30 years ago, making them less reliable because of changes in the
economic, political and cultural arenas (Schwartz, 1994). Second,  Hofstede's measures apply to
countries as a whole making them inappropriate to use for a collection of individuals (Hofstede 1991, p.
253).  To account for the impact of cultural dimensions on  salesforce compensation preferences, a
coding based on  Hofstede’s theoretical framework (1980) of the  explanations
iii provided by the
respondents was performed. Consequently, two researchers coded each questionnaire in terms of
presence or absence of individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance arguments. Inter-rater
reliability was initially above 80% (80% for risk aversion and 95% for collectivism).  All conflicts were
resolved after discussion.
To check the independence of the three cultural values expressed by the respondents, a  loglinear
analysis was performed and all possible hierarchical models were examined (Bishop et al. 1975).
Loglinear analysis is particularly suitable for examining qualitative data to sort out dependence
relationships. As shown on Table 1, the three cultural values expressed by the respondents are linked.
The initial model featured only main effects, and other models including interaction effects were tested
further unless the likelihood ratio Chi-square improved significantly (p=.05). The goodness of fit measure
used is the likelihood ratio Chi-square statistic that compares the fit of the observed to the expected data16
(i.e., cell frequencies). For the log linear procedure, large Chi-square values and small p values indicate a
poor fit. The data fit best the model including all first order interaction effects (p>.05).
(Include Table 1 about here)
Multiple Correspondence Analysis was then used as a complement to loglinear analysis as suggested by
Van Der Heijden and De Leeuw (1985) to uncover the respondent's cultural value structures.  Multiple
correspondence analysis performs dimensional reduction and is similar to factor analysis but is designed
for nominal data (Hair et al. 1992).  The first two dimensions are plotted in Figure 1.  The singular values
are .65 and .40, and they explain about 42 percent and 16 percent of the total inertia respectively (see
Table 2).  As shown on Figure 1 and Table 3, this first dimension is roughly divided into two sets of
values.  The first set includes individualism, masculinity and low risk aversion (contributions of .18, .13
and .08 respectively) and the other collectivism, feminism and high risk aversion (contributions of .09,
.09 and .08 respectively). The second dimension is dominated by feminine values (contribution is .41),
whereas the third one is representative of risk attitudes (contributions of .47 and .16 for low and high-
risk aversion respectively).  Furthermore, a Guttman effect (Tenenhaus and Young 1985; Weller and
Romney 1990) -represented by a W-shaped curve drawn on the two-dimensional space- was detected
(see Figure 1) providing evidence for a hierarchy of values in the correspondence space.  Therefore,
depending on their position on this W-shaped curve,  the respondents'  cultural values  fall into two
distinctly ordered value structures.  Hence, respondents using feminine justifications are likely to refer to
high risk aversion and collectivism (see the left-hand side of Figure 1), which can be interpreted as a sort
of group-centric philosophy. An opposite value structure, which is labeled market-centric philosophy,17
was also uncovered when respondents referring to low risk aversion also express individualistic and
masculine values.
(Include Figure 1, Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here)
Combining those results with the data (see Table 5), a typology of cultural profiles emerges.  A first
group of respondents who are  market-centric include respondents who adopt the market-like
philosophy described above, namely, respondents using masculine, individualistic and low risk aversion
types of arguments. A further examination of their comments confirms that this type of respondents
recommend pay for performance, individual performance evaluations, objective settings, and motivation
through commissions. As shown on Table 6, they represent about 29% of the total sample, the most
common German profile, and the least common French profile (54% and 18% of the German and
French respondents respectively).  Their younger age (42 versus 44 for the respondents who are not
market-centric) appears to be the only significant demographic characteristic differentiating them from
the other respondents. A second group of respondents, who are  group-centric, prefer the group
philosophy described above. They are not only using feminine arguments but also collectivist and high-
risk aversion types of justifications.  Interestingly,  some  mention immoral aspects of incentive
compensation, because they perceive commission-based pay packages as perverse, designed to break
established group norms, and compromising the achievement of group objectives. In essence, they
believe that incentive-based systems turn individuals against each other. They represent the most
common cultural profile in France and Italy (56% and 40% of the French and Italian respondents
respectively). Their older age (45 versus 43 for the respondents who are not group-centric) and longer
experience in the financial sector (21 versus 18 years for the respondents who are not group-centric)18
appear to be the only demographic characteristics that significantly differ with the rest of the sample.  A
third group is also recognizable from its simultaneous focus on masculinity, collectivism and high-risk
aversion.  This group, which we label the  hybrid group, counts a fourth of French and Italian
respondents but only 10% of the German respondents.
ANALYSIS PROCEDURE AND RESULTS
The respondents' preferences for variable versus fixed compensation on one hand and for individual
(equity) versus group (equal) distribution of at risk remuneration on the other hand, was modeled via 2
logistic regressions. Positive coefficients imply a tendency to prefer variable compensation or group
distribution of rewards. The independent variables include the following 4 categorical variables: cultural
profile (group-centric, market-centric and  hybrid); national culture (France, Germany and Italy);
expatriate work experience (yes or no); hierarchical position (3 levels). Because age and financial sector
seniority appeared to characterize cultural profiles, as mentioned earlier, their impact on both dependent
variables was checked. As the models including them did not significantly improve the Chi² statistics and
they did not appear significant in any of the models, they were not included in the logistic regression
models. The estimation results of the resulting logistic models are shown in Tables 7 and 8.
Determinants of Variable versus Fixed Compensation Preferences
As is evident in Table 7, the type of compensation model (variable vs. fixed compensation) is highly
significant (Chi² = 52.44, p<.01), and correctly classifies 83% of the observations.  Furthermore, the
key predictions are supported. The manager cultural profile significantly influences the likelihood to
choose variable vs. fixed compensation ( Wald = 16.72, p<.01).  Using  hybrid managers as the19
reference profile,  market-centric  managers  choose  variable compensation  significantly  more often
(B=2.32, p<.05) and group-centric managers significantly less often (B=-1.28, p<.05). These results
support the hypotheses that masculine and risk-seeking cultures (market-centric) are more likely to
choose variable compensation than feminine and risk averse cultures (group-centric). Therefore H1 and
H2a are accepted.
As expected, French managers choose  incentive compensation  significantly less  than the reference
profile of Italian managers (B=-1.29, p<.01). Therefore H4a is supported. Finally, the hierarchical level
and expatriation  experiences of managers do not significantly impact their compensation structure
preferences. Consequently H5a and H6a are rejected.
Determinants of Distribution Basis of Rewards Preferences
Table 8 displays results that are also generally consistent with the hypotheses. First, the estimated logistic
model is highly significant (Chi² = 167.78, p<.01), fits the data well (-2 Log Likelihood = 59.24,
Goodness of fit = 99.92), explains 84% of the variance (Nagelkerke R²), and correctly classifies 95% of
the observations. As expected, manager cultural profiles significantly affect the distribution basis for
rewards (Wald = 31.01, p<.01).  Market-centric managers are less likely than the reference profile of
hybrid managers to choose a group allocation of financial rewards (B=-4.87, p<.01). These findings are
consistent with the hypotheses that collectivist and feminine cultures are more likely to choose group
distribution of financial rewards than individualistic and masculine cultures.  Therefore H2b and H3 are
accepted. Furthermore neither national culture nor hierarchical level or expatriation experience
significantly influence the preferred reward distribution basis of the managers. Consequently, H4b, H5b
and H6b are rejected.20
[Tables 7 and 8 about here]
DISCUSSION
In this article, the impact of managers’ cultural dimensions and personal characteristics on  salesforce
compensation preferences are explored. Drawing on insights from salesforce compensation literature and
Hofstede's cultural dimensions (1980), a framework is proposed within which both cultural dimensions
and personal characteristics influence managers' preference for (1) the level of salespeople incentive
compensation and (2) the basis for salespeople reward distribution. Specific hypotheses underlying this
framework were tested with a French, German and Italian sample of managers of financial institutions.
The results support the thrust of our study that both nationality and transnational cultural profiles influence
managers' preferences for salesforce compensation systems. Individualistic, masculine and less risk
averse managers prefer (1) higher levels of variable remuneration and (2) more equitable distribution of
rewards for salespeople than collectivist, feminine and risk averse managers. But the widely held opinion
that national culture can explain managers’ preferences for a compensation plan receives mixed support.
While French managers do prefer more fixed compensation than German or Italian managers, nationality
was not found to significantly influence managers' preferences for the equity vs. equality principle of
reward allocation. In the first case, transnational as well as national specificity explains the respondents’
preferences but in the second case only transnational manager cultural profiles are significant.
One possible explanation includes the fact that the principles of group vs. individual sharing of rewards
are more “universal” than the equity vs. equality principles. Such a difference may come from the21
increasingly  strong focus  firms put on  teamwork. Consequently, in accordance with the cultural
convergence proposition, national specificity related to incentives sharing bases tend to vanish.
These results provide theoretical, methodological and managerial contributions. First, even though our
results are exploratory, they shed some light on the compensation issue in the international arena. Hence,
the immoral dimension of incentive-based pay packages presented by group-centric managers, seems
to be a new issue to the study of incentive compensation. They not only  raise an ethical issue (i.e.,
individually-based rewards are perverse since they break the group norms), but also an economic issue
(i.e., to favor élites demotivates the rest of the group resulting in an overall  performance reduction).
Perhaps the essentially North American setting of research on this topic explains this oversight.
However, if this finding is confirmed, thorough theoretical work should be undertaken to uncover optimal
structures with this new variable.  More to the point, the vast sales management literature should be
scrutinized with a cultural framework since the majority of research studies  are exclusively North
American. Furthermore, our findings offer partial support to Milkovich and Bloom (1998) who argue
that strategic flexibility (i.e., customizing multiple pay packages and managing the resulting diversity to
achieve strategic priorities and create global mind-sets), rather than national culture, should serve as a
basis for managing international compensation and reward systems. Hence, if transnational cultural
profiles do exist, then compensation strategy should indeed rely on new measures.
Second, our study uses a different methodological approach for assessing cultural dimensions
traditionally measured with Hofstede’s indexes (1980) (e.g., Roth 1995; Steenkamp et al. 1999).  This
was done for three reasons. First, those indexes were initially developed from survey data of primarily
mid-level managers and operational employees of IBM, a large multinational corporation.  It is unclear22
that they apply to a more educated, less cosmopolitan sample of managers across a wide range of
hierarchical positions working in the finance sector. Second, it is important to check if the cultural
dimensions measured are independent; Finally, the exploratory nature of the study dictated a qualitative
approach which enabled us to uncover motives ( e.g., immorality)  not  previously  mentioned in the
literature.
A third contribution is that the study provides a starting point for assisting managers responsible for
designing international compensation systems. Several hints such as the observed discrepancies across
countries already suggest the need for more systematic investigations of cultural effects in sales
management. However little guidance is available for the growing practice of international sales
management.
Our research has some limitations that indicate several avenues for further research. Given that only
financial institutions are sampled, it would be interesting to see if these findings generalize to other
industries. Likewise, as only managers from France, Germany and Italy participated; it is important to
verify that the results hold across other national boundaries. Finally, an extension of this investigation to
the United States would provide answers to questions related to European specificity. Will the European
sales management model be different from the North American one? The American banking industry lost
customers to competing non-financial institutions during the 1980s.  To win back some of this business,
bankers essentially became salespeople even to the extent of learning sales techniques and receiving
incentive compensation (Sales & Marketing Management 1995).  European banking is deregulating
and will soon face more and more competition.  Consequently it may be tempting to import the market-23
centric model championed in North America.  Failure to take into account existing national and, more
importantly, hidden transnational managerial values will certainly cause havoc.24
NOTES
                                                                
i We agree with Steenkamp et al. (1999) that Hofstede’s labels (1980) should be replaced by descriptions not related to
gender-role stereotypes.
ii Back translations confirmed the quality of the original translations and the invariance of the research instrument.
iii All translated in French by two bilingual researchers in order to provide a uniform text for the coders.